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1. Introduction
Watermarking techniques have been extensively studied and applied to digital text and image
documents for applications such as author and/or content authentication. However, most of
these techniques are not designed or intended to be robust to the PS channel and associated
distortions. General office/business documents and the associated flow of office information
usually, for many different reasons, need to suffer a digital-to-analog conversion through
printing and scanning processes, which brings to authentication methods the necessity of
robustness to this process.
Many approaches in the literature deals with the document hardcopy authentication problem.
Brassil et al. propose in Brassil et al. (1999) authentication methods based on shift coding
(line, word, etc.). Those methods, in order to be robust to the PS channel, require uniformly
spaced centroids, which are not easily achieved in practice. Wu et al. develop in Wu
& Liu (2004) an authentication method where some pixels of the characters are flipped
from black to white or vice versa, which requires a high quality printing and scanning
process. More recently, the text luminance modulation (TLM) approach was investigated
in Borges & Mayer (2006b); Víllan et al. (2006). In order to embed information, this
approach modulates the luminance of the characters by changing the character color intensity
or gray level. This approach provides a very low perceptual impact, high capacity, and
robustness to the PS channel. Most of the works are intended for invisible watermark
embedding. On the other hand, binary one-dimension (1D) or multi-level two-dimension
(2D) barcodes are quite visible and yet can also be applied for document authentication
Quintela & Pérez-González (2003); Víllan et al. (2005). Visible watermarking provides a
way to certify legal copies and also a way to quick recognize that the document has been
authenticated. This approach of using a logo/seal has been used for centuries for document
authentication of authorship and information contents. These are very interesting properties
to be considered in authentication applications. Still, visible watermarking has not received
significant attention from researchers for applications like hardcopy document authentication.
For image copyright protection, visible watermarking has been studied in Braudaway et al.
(1996), M.S. Kankanhalli (1999), and Y. Hu (2003), for example, but none of the methods is
able to survive the PS process. Also, they do not carry any information besides the visual logo
inserted in the image.
In this work we present a document authentication technique which inserts visible logos to
the document. In contrast to traditional invisible watermarking techniques, visible logos can
8
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provide instant recognition of the copyrights of the document. Although visible, the inserted
logos are unobtrusive, which means that they are sufficiently transparent in order to allow a
clear interpretation of the information conveyed by the text. We illustrate that the proposed
technique is able to use a very transparent logo and yet provide a robust detection. In our
method, in addition to the recognition of the visible logo, we also authenticate the document
by coding information bits (a code generated from the sensitive parts of the document like
names, dates, or values, for instance) associated with the position of the inserted logos. This
coding approach, coined position based watermarking (PBW), was originally exploited by
Borges and Mayer in Borges & Mayer (2003), but it was not designed specifically to be robust
to the PS channel. Also, the PBWwas originally designed and analyzed only to the insertion of
invisible Gaussian marks in digital images. In order to be robust to the PS process, and able to
be applied for document authentication, this paper proposes to improve the PBW technique.
Moreover, our method can be used along with barcodes, TLM and other techniques. A
combination of these methods with the proposed one can provide superior robustness and
high payload when compared to an isolated technique. Moreover, these techniques can be
designed to have a very small interference among them.
Besides, we analyze the applicability of the developed method for the case where the
authenticated document is printed on recycled paper. For this case, we characterize the noise
imposed by the recycled paper, estimate the autocorrelation function of this noise, and a new
detector is derived. Also, some new analyses are presented.
To achieve the development of the new binary document authentication method proposed
here, this paper brings the following contributions: (i) the definition of a simple but effective
analytical model to the PS channel; (ii) the derivation of optimal detectors and optimal
detection threshold for cases of white or recycled paper documents; (iii) identification and
characterization of the segmentation noise; (iv) characterization of the pattern noise for a
recycled paper; and (v) the determination of the position error identification during logo
detection. The remain of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 some of the main
distortions found in the PS channel are discussed and a simple but effective channel model
is proposed. Details on the logos insertion and detection processes, the development of an
optimal detection threshold for the proposedmethod, an error probability analysis, the lower
bound capacity of the method, and the analysis of the position error are all presented in
Section 3. The analysis of the applicability of the method for recycled paper documents is
presented in Section 4. Also in this section we characterize the recycled paper noise and
a new detector is derived. The new detector depends on the autocorrelation matrix of the
recycled paper noise and this matrix is deduced in Section 5. Some experiments to illustrate
the discussions and performance of themethod are in Section 6. Section 7 concludes this paper
and present some future works.
2. Printing-scanning channel
2.1 PS channel distortions
When a grayscale document is printed, digital halftoning (gray to binary conversion) takes
place in order to print with bilevel devices. Moreover, the spreading of the toner or ink on the
hardcopy introduces another distortion similar to a blurring effect Norris & Smith (2004).
In the scanner, another blurring distortion is generated by the optics and motion of the
inline CCD. Geometric distortions, including rotation, cropping and scaling take place in
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the scanning process. A misplacement of the paper over the flatbed scanner may rotate the
document. Cropping appears both during manual placement and scanning region selection.
Scaling is originated by employing different system resolutions.
Furthermore, both devices have non-linear gains. An offset gain is generated by the printing
process due to the toner or ink black color offset. Another non-linear gain is generated by
scanner non-linear filters and color adjustments.
2.2 PS channel model
Taking into account the distortions imposed by the PS channel, we investigate a simple model
for those distortions in order to design and evaluate our method. In this way, we point out
below some considerations and the final model proposed for tests.
As halftoning is device dependent, we propose to convert the grayscale logo to a bilevel
representation employing our own halftoning technique. This approach prevents the
halftoning noise generated by the printer’s algorithm and allows us to choose a simplified
analytical model for the PS channel when compared to the some existing models Borges &
Mayer (2006b); Quintela & Pérez-González (2003). Moreover, we disregard the non-linear
gain due to toner and consider the printing blurring effect as a low-pass filtering. Blurring
due to the scanner is also modeled as a low-pass filtering.
Regarding geometric distortions, we assume that significant rotation can only occur if
someone badly operates the scanner by mistake. For authentication applications, the user
is interested in help the authentication process and does not attempt to remove or deteriorate
the watermark by rotation. Thus, we are not concerned with rotation as a distortion to be
modeled and assume that proper placement is done by the user. Regarding cropping, we are
eliminating the margins of the document and preserving only its internal content. Moreover,
internal cropping is not considered in our model because the user is assumed to avoid it in
order to keep the document authentication. Scaling is a problem intrinsic to the scanning
process but it can be reversed by many different methods already available in the literature
Zitová & Flusser (2003). In our experiments we assume a controllable environment where all
the resolutions employed on the system are known and rescaling can be achieved by a bicubic
interpolation when necessary. We also disregard non-linear gains, since we are detecting the
logos by a correlation based template matching (CBTM) method, which is quite robust to
small non-linear disturbances.
Considering the assumptions above, our PS channel model is written as:
Yr = (Dw ∗H) + ηe (1)
where Yr is the watermarked document processed by the PS channel; Dw is the digital
watermarked document; ’*’ represents the 2D convolution; the noise term ηe represents
the electronic noise of the devices and is assumed to be an uncorrelated Gaussian noise,
ηe ≈ N (0, σ2ηe ). Moreover, we assume that Hp and Hs model the blurring effect of the printing
and scanning, respectively. Considering that the low-pass effect due to scanning prevails over
that of printing, we can write Hs ∗Hp ≈ Hs = H. We can model it as a Butterworth low-pass
filter described by
H(u, v) =
1
1+ [D(u, v)/D0]2n
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where n is the filter order, D0 is the cutoff frequency, and D(u, v) is the Euclidean distance
from point u, v to the origin (center) of the frequency spectrum. The parameters of the filter
are estimated by comparing the frequency responses of an original digital document image
and its PS version after several experiments. During the tests we found out that the order n
and cutoff frequency D0 are device dependent. Indeed, we could determine typical values
for laser and for inkjet printers. The best approximation of the frequency response for the PS
process in the case of laser printers are n = 3 and D0 = 0.4, and n = 1 and D0 = 0.12 for inkjet
printer.
PS Channel
Yr
Dw
ηe
H
Fig. 1. PS channel model.
3. Proposed method
3.1 The insertion
Let us consider a binary text document D of size M′× N′ and a grayscale logo L of size M× N,
both with pixel amplitudes in the [0, 1] range. The insertion of the logos is an additive process
which is not applied over the characters. The insertion position coding rule is derived from
Borges & Mayer (2003).
Once the insertion position is defined according to the authentication bits, we compute
Y = X + (Lht − 1) to effectively insert the logo. X is a document region to be marked, Lht
represents the bilevel version of the original grayscale logo with adjusted energy, and Y is the
watermarked document region. The subtraction by 1 is employed to guarantee the insertion
of the logo only in the background of the document leaving the characters intact after negative
saturation (quantization). The block diagram of the insertion process is shown in Fig. 2, where
α controls the watermark strength. Considering that the logo is previously defined and does
not convey any authentication bits and that the halftoningmethod employed is known, the Lht
logo is a deterministic signal in the process. The chosen detector relies on these assumptions.
3.2 The detection
A correlation based template matching, which is equivalent to the matched filter (MF) detector,
is employed for the detection of the logos. It is well known that this is the optimum detector
for deterministic signal (logo filtered by H) corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise Kay
(1998). This is the assumed scenario depicted in Fig. 1. The mathematical definition of the
136 Watermarking – Volume 1
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Y
α
Logo halftoning
X
−1
Lht
Fig. 2. Block diagram of the insertion process.
detector is given by
ρ = 〈Yp,Lps〉 =
M
∑
i=1
N
∑
j=1
YpijLpsij , (2)
where Yp is a region of the watermarked document already processed by the PS channel, and
Lps = Lht ∗ H is the halftoned logo (Lht) pre-filtered by the low-pass filter (H) modeling our
PS channel. Therefore, as Lht and H are deterministic variables, Lps will also be deterministic.
Fig. 3 depicts the detection process. The CBTM operation needs to be performed to each
pixel of the whole document and it is very time consuming. Taking advantage of the
convolution theorem of the Fourier Transform, we speed up the detection by performing
it on the frequency domain Gonzalez (1992). The received document is composed of the
Yp
Lht
H
CBTM
ρ
Lps
Fig. 3. Block diagram of the detection process.
logos, the characters and noise. As the logo positions carry the authentication information,
characters are considered as perturbing noise. Thus we segment the characters from the
received document before performing the detection. The segmentation relies on a global
threshold obtained by Otsu’s method Otsu (1979). Due to the PS blurring effect, the borders
of the characters are degraded, preventing from a perfect segmentation. We named this
degradation as segmentation noise. For binary documents watermarked with low energy and
more transparent logos, our experiments illustrate that this segmentation noise follows a
uniform distribution with values varying from 0.560 to 0.996 (1 is the white background of
the document). In Fig. 4 we show a histogram that characterize this noise. In this Figure the
vertical axis represents the logarithm of the pixel occurrence and the horizontal axis represents
the pixel value. Results illustrate that the segmentation of the characters brings a significant
improvement on the detection error probability.
3.3 Optimal detection threshold
Having defined the detection metric (2) we need now to determine the detection threshold
in order to indicate the presence of one or more logos in the document. In general,
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Fig. 4. Histogram of the segmentation noise.
the watermarking literature employs the Neyman-Pearson criterion Kay (1998) for the
determination of the detection threshold. Considering the nature of our application we
propose an optimal detection threshold based on the minimum error criterion as follows.
The total detection error probability (TDEP) Pe as a function of the threshold is defined as
Pe(τ) = P0Pf a(τ) + P1Pf n(τ) (3)
where Pf a(τ) and Pf n(τ) are, respectively, the probabilities of false alarm and false negative
detection for a given threshold τ; P0 and P1 represent the a priori probabilities of the unmarked
and marked regions, respectively.
By noting that our detection metric ρ (eq. (2)) is a sum of statistically independent terms and
considering the Central Limit Theorem (CLT), we can assume that the probability density
function (pdf) of Pf a and Pf n can be approximated by a normal pdf. This assumption is
verified in practice. Hence, the TDEP can be written as
Pe(τ) =
P0√
2piσρ0
∫ ∞
τ
exp
[
− (ρ− µρ0)
2
2σ2ρ0
]
dρ+
+
P1√
2piσρ1
∫ τ
−∞
exp
[
− (ρ− µρ1)
2
2σ2ρ1
]
dρ (4)
where µρ0 and µρ1 are the mean values; σρ0 and σρ1 are the standard deviations about the
means of the unmarked and marked regions respectively. To find the threshold τ that
minimizes the TDEP given the constrain P0 + P1 = 1, we differentiate Pe(τ) with respect
to τ and equate the result to zero. Thus, we get a quadratic equation in the form
Aτ2 + Bτ + C = 0 (5)
where
A = σ2ρ0 − σ2ρ1
B = 2(σ2ρ1µρ0 − σ2ρ0µρ1)
C = σ2ρ0µ
2
ρ1
− σ2ρ1µ2ρ0 + 2σ2ρ0σ2ρ1 log
P0σ1
P1σ0
.
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From equation (7), σ2ρ1 = σ
2
ρ0
, and consequently A = 0. Therefore, equation (5) is reduced to a
first order equation, and the optimal detection threshold is given by
Bτ + C = 0. (6)
3.4 Error probability
Let us define two regions: H0 the hypothesis of non-marked regions and H1 the hypothesis
of the marked regions, so that⎧⎨
⎩
H0 : ρ0 =
〈
W,ηs + ηe
〉 ∼= 〈W,ηs〉
H1 : ρ1 =
〈
W,W + ηe + ηs
〉 ∼= 〈W,W + ηs〉
where W = (L ∗H) is a deterministic variable that represents the logo processed by the filter of
the PS channel, ηs is an i.i.d. uniformly distributed variable that represents the segmentation
noise, and ηe is an i.i.d. zero mean Gaussian distributed variable that represents the electronic
noise. Also, considering that the segmentation noise ηs prevails over the electronic noise ηe,
we assume ηs + ηe ∼= ηs.
To determine the error probability, the mean and variance of the hypotheses H0 and H1 are
derived. The mean ofH0 hypothesis is
µρ0 = E{ρ0} = E
⎧⎨
⎩
M,N
∑
i,j=1
Wijηsij
⎫⎬
⎭ = µηs
M,N
∑
i,j=1
Wij.
Before the correlation process, the logo mean is removed so that E{L} = 0. Besides, its
assumed that the sum of the PS filter coefficients equals to one, such that the filtering process
does not alter the mean. Therefore, ∑
M,N
i,j=1 Wij = 0, consequently, µρ0 = 0.
The variance ofH0 hypothesis is given by
σ
2
ρ0
= E{ρ20} − µ2ρ0 =
[
σ
2
ηs
+ µ2ηs
] M,N
∑
i,j=1
W2ij
where µηs and σ
2
ηs
are, respectively, the mean and variance of the segmentation noise and are
given by
µηs =
a+b
2 σ
2
ηs
= (b−a)
2
12 ,
where a represents the beginning of the uniform distribution, and b represents the end of the
distribution as depicted in Fig. 5.
The mean of H1 hypothesis is given by
µρ1 = E{ρ1} =
M,N
∑
i,j=1
[
W2ij + WijE{ηsij}
]
=
M,N
∑
i,j=1
W2ij
139ardcopy Watermarki g for D cument Authentication
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a b
Fig. 5. Example of a uniform distribution.
and the variance is
σ
2
ρ1
= E{ρ21} − µ2ρ1
= E
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
⎡
⎣M,N∑
i,j=1
(W2ij + Wijηsij )
⎤
⎦
2
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭− µ2ρ1 = σ2ρ0 . (7)
Now, recalling equation (4) we have
Pe =
P0
2
erfc
⎛
⎝ τ− µρ0√
2σ2ρ0
⎞
⎠+ P1
2
erfc
⎛
⎝µρ1 − τ√
2σ2ρ1
⎞
⎠
where erfc() is the complementary error function. Pe is the error probability of one detection.
The total error probability must take into account all the M′N′ detections. If we miss one logo
we could not decode the message. Thus, letting Q represents the amount of marked points
and K = M′N′ the total amount of pixels of the document, the probability of missing the
message (Pet) carried by the logos is
Pet = 1− (1− Pe)Q(K−Q) . (8)
3.5 Lower bound capacity
The capacity of our method is directly dependent on the document and logo size. Also,
due to the statistical nature of the employed detectors, logo superposition is not allowed.
Although we know that this restriction will compromise the capacity, error probability will
not be affected, and we prefer this more conservative choice. Another important point to be
considered is the necessity to define a region of insertion and not just a pixel of insertion for
the logo. This fact will be properly discussed in section 3.6. For the capacity development we
will consider an insertion region of size J × J pixels. Therefore, given a document with M× N
pixels and a logo with U ×V pixels, we can determine the available insertion area Ai by
Ai =
(
M
J
−U + 1
)(
N
J
−V + 1
)
. (9)
In order to ensure logo superposition avoidance we are considering the logo with the triple
of his original size. This is the worse case but the safest in terms of error probability.
Nevertheless, we know from experiments that it is possible to insert closer logos without
over compromise the detection. Anyway, we decided to opt for a more conservative choice.
So, the amount of available insertion positions in the document is given by
p =
(
M
J
−U + 1
)(
N
J
−V + 1
)
− (Q− 1)(9UV − 1) (10)
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where Q represents the amount of logos to be inserted. Note that equation (10) can produce
not allowed results. If p < Q we have more logos than available positions. This is not possible
and one should change the size of the document or the size of the logo. The insertion is only
possible if p ≥ Q.
The combination of the p available positions with the Q amount of logos to be inserted gives
us
Comb(p,Q) =
p!
(p − Q)!Q! . (11)
Now, the capacity C in bits can be obtained by
C = log2[Comb(p, Q)]. (12)
The equation (12) gives us the lower bound capacity C of our method in bits. To illustrate this
equation, in Fig. 6 we present the capacity plot for a 7000× 5000 pixels document considering
that the insertion region has 7× 7 pixels. The graphics are presented for logo size of 64× 64,
and 128× 128 pixels. In Fig. 7 we show similar plots but now considering that the insertion
region has 3× 3 pixels.
(a) 64× 64 pixels logo. (b) 128× 128 pixels logo.
Fig. 6. Capacity for a 7000× 5000 pixels document with a 7× 7 pixels insertion region.
(a) 64× 64 pixels logo. (b) 128× 128 pixels logo.
Fig. 7. Capacity for a 7000× 5000 pixels document with a 3× 3 pixels insertion region.
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3.6 Position error
The logo detection is performed by a correlation process. The message conveyed is coded
in the logo insertion positions. Therefore, when we process a detection we are interested in
identify the presence or not of a logo, and his position in the document. In order to estimate
the logo position after detection, we determine the correlation peaks above the threshold. This
peak is considered to be the insertion position. In Fig. 8 we show a graph that exemplify a
detection. To estimate the insertion positions we determine the peaks above the threshold
(horizontal dashed line).
Fig. 8. Detection example.
In general, the logo is a correlated image and the whole authentication process is noisy. Due
to the correlation of the logo and the noise of the entire process, there is a possibility that we
make a mistake in the estimation of the logo position. We call this mistake as position error. In
the sequel of this section we present the mathematical development that models the position
error.
The logo detection is performed by a correlation process that can be generalized by
C[n] = ∑
k
x[k]m[k− n] (13)
where x represents the test logo and therefore, is a deterministic variable. m represents the
logo presented in the document and this is given by
m[n] = x[n] + r[n]. (14)
Taking into account the CLT, we assume that r is an i.i.d. noise with Gaussian distribution,
r ≈ N (0, σ2r ). Also, we assume that this noise models all the distortions generated by the PS
channel associated with the segmentation noise. So that we have
C[n] = ∑
k
x[k] {x[k − n] + r[k− n]} = ∑
k
x[k]x[k − n] + ∑
k
x[k]r[k− n]. (15)
42 Watermarking – Volume 1
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Analyzing the mean of equation (15) we have
µC[n] = E{C[n]} = E
{
∑
k
x[k]x[k− n] + ∑
k
x[k]r[k− n]
}
.
As x is a deterministic variable,
E{C[n]} = ∑
k
x[k]x[k− n] +∑
k
x[k]E{r[k− n]} = ∑
k
x[k]x[k − n] = Cx[n]. (16)
The variance of equation (15) is given by
σ
2
C[n] = EC[n]
2− E2{C[n]} (17)
= E
{
∑
k
x[k]m[k− n]∑
l
x[l]m[l− n]
}
− E2{C[n]}
= Cx[n]
2 + ∑
k
x[n]2E{r[k− n]2} − E2{C[n]} (18)
From equation (16)
E{C[n]} = Cx[n], (19)
therefore,
E2{C[n]} = Cx[n]2 (20)
and equation (18) can be rewritten as,
σ
2
C[n] = Cx[n]
2 + ∑
k
x[k]2E{r[k− n]2} − Cx[n]2 = σ2r ∑
k
x[k]2 = σ2r Cx[0]. (21)
As can be seen in equation (21), the variance of the correlation process of the test logo with
the document logo is dependent on the noise energy present in the document. For this reason,
in some detections the correlation peak may not correspond to the exact insertion position of
the logo but to a close adjacent position. This means that from the detection point of view
the insertion point can not be a specific point but a small region of size J × J pixels. Which is
called insertion region. In section 6.3 we present an experiment that illustrate how to define the
size of the insertion region for a determined logo.
4. Applicability of the technique for recycled paper document
Considering that 90% of paper pulp is made of wood, recycling is a very important action that
brings a good impact for the environment. Many companies have already decided to use just
recycled paper for their whole bulk of office-like documents. For this reason we investigate
the applicability of the Position Based Hardcopy Watermarking (PBHW) technique for the
authentication of documents printed on recycled paper.
The very important point to be analyzed is the fact that a recycled paper is not white. It has
a kind of noise imposed by the recycling process. We have analyzed this pattern of noise and
concluded that it has an interesting characteristic. It can be easily modeled by a Gaussian
distribution function with mean µpn = 150 and variance σ2pn = 16.5, ηpn ≈ N (µpn, σ2pn). In
Fig. 9 it is depicted the histogram of a recycled paper page sample that illustrates the typical
distribution of a recycled paper pattern noise.
143ardcopy Watermarki g for D cument Authentication
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Fig. 9. Histogram of a recycled paper page sample.
The proposed PBHW technique makes use of a MF for logo detection. This detector is known
to be optimum for deterministic signals corrupted by uncorrelated Gaussian noise Kay (1998).
Taking into account the low-pass filtering characteristic of our PS channel, the Gaussian
pattern noise ηpn of a recycled paper will become a correlated noise. Thus, the MF will be
not optimum anymore. Therefore, we investigate a new detector.
4.1 Optimum detector for recycled paper document
Given a received signal y, the detection problem we are dealing with can be characterized
by the detection of a deterministic signal s corrupted by correlated Gaussian noise η.
Consequently, we have two statistical hypothesis to be verified:{H0 : No marked region. y = η
H1 : Marked region. y = s + η
where s = w ∗ h, and η = ηpn ∗ h. Here w represents the logo, h represents the PS channel
low-pass filter, and ηpn represents the recycle paper noise.
The likelihood ratio is given by
l(y) =
p(y;H1)
p(y;H0) .
Taking the log of both sides of the above equation, we have
L(y) = log l(y)
= log
p(y;H1)
p(y;H0) ,
where p(y;Hi) represents the pdf of y when Hi is true.
Hence, as
p(y;H0) = 1
(2pi)N/2|R|1/2 exp
[
− 1
2
yTR−1y
]
44 Watermarking – Volume 1
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p(y;H1) = 1
(2pi)N/2|R|1/2 exp
[
− 1
2
(y − µy)TR−1(y − µy)
]
we have
L(y) = log p(y;H1)
p(y;H0)
= log
1
(2pi)N/2|R|1/2 exp
[
− 12 (y − µy)TR−1(y − µy)
]
1
(2pi)N/2|R|1/2 exp
[
− 12yTR−1y
]
=
1
2
[
yTR−1y − (y − µy)TR−1(y − µy)
]
= yTR−1µy − 1
2
µy
TR−1µy.
In this way, the optimum detector for the presented situation is given by the logarithm of the
likelihood ratio as
L(y) = yTR−1µy − 1
2
µy
TR−1µy. (22)
From equation (22) we can say that the detector decidesH1 if
L(y) = yTR−1s− 1
2
sTR−1s > logγ.
As the fraction 12 s
TR−1s is independent of the observations, we say that
yTR−1s > logγ+ 1
2
sTR−1s.
Letting
(
logγ+ 12 s
TR−1s
)
= γ′ we got
yTR−1s > γ′.
Now, the test statistic for the detector is given by
Tpn(y) = y
TR−1s. (23)
Comparing equation (23) with the literature of detection theory, we note that the developed
detector corresponds to the generalized matched filter (GMF) Kay (1998). Also, taking into
account the CLT, we assume that the test statistic of equation (23) has a Gaussian distribution.
Consequently, the optimal detection threshold developed in Section 3.3 is still valid for this
detector. So that, in the above development we can say that γ′ = τ′. The statistics of the
detection variable Tpn(y) are equated in 9, and are summarized in (24).
Tpn(y) =
{
N (0, sTR−1Ts) : paraH0
N (sTR−1s, sTR−1T s) : paraH1
(24)
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As the matrix R is toeplitz Manolakis et al. (2000), it is known that RT = R Strang (1988).
Besides, as (R−1)T = (RT)−1, we conclude that (R−1)T = R−1. So,
Tpn(y) =
{N (0, sTR−1s) : paraH0
N (sTR−1s, sTR−1s) : paraH1 (25)
Now, from equations (23) and (25) we see that both depends on the autocorrelation matrix (R)
of the correlated Gaussian noise that models the recycled paper background processed by the
PS channel. In the next section we determine the values of that matrix and point out some
considerations on the matrix.
5. Estimation of the R matrix
As shown in Section 4.1, the developed detector is dependent on the autocorrelation matrix
of the correlated Gaussian noise that models the recycled paper background processed by the
PS channel. For that reason we need to estimate the R matrix. As discussed in (Therrien, 1992,
Chap. 6), the simplest but effective way of estimating a correlation matrix is by means of the
autocorrelation method. Thus, we define this method to perform the estimation of the R matrix.
The estimation procedure using the autocorrelation method can be summarized as following.
First, we generate a Gaussian noise with mean 150 and variance 16.5 (in accordance
with Section 4) and processed it by the PS channel. After, we obtained Ns pixel values,
x[0], x[1], . . . , x[Ns − 1]. In order to estimate the autocorrelation matrix R of dimension P × P,
we formed the data matrix X of dimension (Ns + P − 1)× P.
X =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x[0] 0 · · · 0
x[1] x[0] · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
x[P − 1] x[P − 2] · · · x[0]
x[P] x[P − 1] · · · x[1]
...
...
...
x[Ns − 1] x[Ns − 2] · · · x[Ns − P]
0 x[Ns − 1] · · ·
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · x[Ns − 1]
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(26)
The estimation of the autocorrelation matrix R is given by
R =
1
Ns
XHX (27)
where XH means the conjugate transpose of the matrix X.
The R matrix defined in equation (27) is Toeplitz Therrien (1992) but it is not sparse.
Considering the size of an A4 page document (≈ 7000 × 5000 pixels), the size of the logo
could not be so small in order to be visually recognizable. This means the R matrix, which is
proportional to the logo size, will be large. For instance, for a 128× 128 pixels logo (which is
relatively small), the R matrix will have 16384 × 16384 elements. In the detection process of
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equation (23) this matrix needs to be inverted, whichmeans a very high computational cost for
a large matrix. Therefore, we analyzed the values of the R matrix running simple experiments
and we could realize that this matrix can be approximated by an sparse matrix keeping the
first 50 values and zeroing the others. In Fig. 10 we illustrate the distribution of the values of
matrix R with dimension 400× 400 elements. Fig. 11 depicts the plot of a line of the R matrix.
Fig. 10. Plot of the values of the R matrix with 400× 400 elements.
As this matrix is Toeplitz, only a line is enough to characterize it at all Strang (1988).
Fig. 11. Plot of a line of the R matrix.
6. Experiments
In this section we provide experiments to show the performance of the proposed method. It
is important to comment that for the experiments presented in this paper we have used the
multifunctional HP M1120, HP PSC1510, and the printers HP P1005, HP LJ-1100. For those
devices, the typical values for parameter of equations (1) and (21) are
• σ2ηe = 0.01
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• σ2r = 0.15
6.1 On characters segmentation
We have pointed out at Section 3.2 that characters segmentation brings a significant
improvement on the detection error probability. To notice the improvement obtained by the
detector after characters segmentation, we present in Fig. 12 a comparison of the correlation
plots. In Fig. 12(a) we have a plot of the correlation values without characters segmentation,
and in Fig. 12(b) the segmentation was performed before the detection process. In both plots
the dashed line represents the optimal detection threshold obtained from equation (5) with
appropriate values for the means and variances for each case. The error probability associated
to each detection is Pe = 3.5× 10−39 in the case of characters segmentation before correlation,
and Pe = 3.71× 10−30 when segmentation is not employed.
6.2 Experiments with real logos
In this part of the experiments we present results obtained from using a real logo. This logo is
shown in Fig. 13.
In Fig. 14 we show part of a marked document after printing and scanning with an HP
multifunctional LaserJet device model M1120. The logo has only 10% of his total energy
which is very transparent and permits reading the text without any difficulty. This document
has originally 300ppi. The printer resolution was set to 600dpi and the scanning resolution to
300ppi. The result of the detection process is presented in Fig. 15.
These experiments illustrate that the robustness of the method is not significantly
compromised even for a logo with reduced energy.
6.3 Position error experiment
The proposed method suffers from some specific geometric distortions that occurs in the PS
channel. These distortions are not properly modeled on the PS channel model described in
section 2.2. Therefore, during the logo detection process in a document processed by the PS
channel, some little distortions due to the printing and scanning processes will occur. Besides,
as the logo image is, in general, correlated, our position estimation strategy may generate an
error. This error was model in section 3.6. Here we demonstrate how to evaluate this error
and determine the size of the insertion region to be considered both in the insertion and in the
detection process. In Fig. 13 it is shown the digital logo used for this experiment. First we
compute the logo autocorrelation Cx[n]. This is presented in Fig. 16. As already explained in
section 3.6, the peak of the correlation of the original logo with the document logo will suffer
a disturbance from the total noise present in the document. Considering the CLT, we assume
that the total noise present in the document has a Gaussian pdf. Thus r ≈ N (0, σ2r ), where
r represents the total noise of the document. This noise includes the electronic noise, small
imperfections in the paper, dirt particles present on the paper, small geometric distortions like
small rotations inherent to the PS process, among others. This noise was evaluated during
some experiments and we assume that, typically, it has σ2r = 0.15.
The next step is to evaluate the variation of the value of the n correlations taking into account
the action of the total noise over the correlations. After, determine until which point there is a
possibility of a correlation value be greater than the value em n = 0. In the case of the logo of
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(a) Correlation before characters segmentation.
(b) Correlation after characters segmentation.
Fig. 12. Detection level before and after characters segmentation.
Fig. 13, the first six correlation values can, depending on the influence of the noise, assume a
value greater than the correlation in n = 0. In Table 1 the correlation values and the variation
of them for the logo are presented.
Analyzing the values of Table 1, we note that for the first tree correlations (n = 3) there is
a possibility of the values be greater than the central value (n = 0). Therefore, for this logo
it is necessary to consider an insertion region of 7× 7 pixels in order to correctly decode the
message. This means that we have to create a mapping table known by the transmitter and the
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Fig. 13. Real logo used in the experiments.
Fig. 14. A watermarked document after PS channel process.
receiver, for instance, in order to map all the 7× 7 pixels of the insertion region to the specific
insertion point.
6.4 Experiment using recycled paper
Here we present an experiment to illustrate the applicability of the method for documents
printed on recycled paper as described in section 4. In Fig. 17(a) it is shown part of a document
printed on a recycled paper. This document was authenticated with one logo in position
(51, 51). The authenticated version is presented in Fig. 17(b). For this case, the logo has
50% of his total energy. This amount of energy is necessary in order to keep the logo visible
and still detectable. The detection plot shown in Fig. 18 was obtained after detection using
equation (23). The optimal threshold was calculated from equation (6) and is represented in
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Fig. 15. Detection plot of Fig. 14.
Fig. 16. Autocorrelation of the logo presented in Fig. 13.
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n Cx[n] min Cx[n] max Cx[n]
0 4.082E+08 3.470E+08 4.695E+08
1 3.762E+08 3.198E+08 4.327E+08
2 3.424E+08 2.910E+08 3.937E+08
3 3.181E+08 2.704E+08 3.659E+08
4 2.962E+08 2.518E+08 3.406E+08
5 2.774E+08 2.358E+08 3.190E+08
6 2.594E+08 2.205E+08 2.983E+08
7 2.432E+08 2.068E+08 2.797E+08
Table 1. Correlation values, their minimum and maximum in accordance with the total noise
variance σ2r for the logo of Fig. 13.
(a) Original document. (b) Authenticated document.
Fig. 17. Example of a document printed on recycle paper.
the graphics as a horizontal dashed line. Analyzing the detection data, we determined the
correlation peak on (51, 51). This corresponds to the exact insertion position of the logo. So
that, we can correctly decode the message conveyed.
6.5 Performance of the detector for documents printed on recycled paper
In the detection theory the way to compare detectors performance is by the receiver operating
characteristics (ROC) curves Kay (1998). The ROC curves are basically the plot of the detection
probability (Pd) versus the false alarm probability (Pf a) of the detector.
To support the development of the optimal detector presented in section 4.1, and to show
the better performance of the GMF against the MF for the case where the authenticated
document has been printed on recycle paper we present here a comparison of both detectors
by means of the ROC curves. For this experiment we simulate the detection of a logo
inserted in a document printed on a recycled paper. This document was processed by the
PS channel in accordance of the model presented in Fig. 1. We have performed tens of
thousands of realizations of the detection process. At the end, we were able to determine the
detection probability and the false alarm probability of the whole process for a specific range
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Fig. 18. Detection plot for experiment using recycled paper.
of detection threshold values. In Fig. 19 it is presented the ROC curves of the experiment.
It is important to note that this is not a theoretical curve. It was obtained by a real detection
process.
Fig. 19. ROC curves comparing the GMF against the MF for detection of logos inserted in
recycled paper.
As expected, analyzing Fig. 19, we note that the MF has a very poor performance compared to
the GMF in the case of document printed on recycled paper. This proves us the applicability
of the developed detector.
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6.6 A complete example
Now let us present a complete example to characterize the usage of the proposed
method. Given we need to authenticate an identification card (ID) as that shown in
Fig. 20 (this example ID has 1243 × 717 pixels) with a binary string computed from
a hashing function Stinson (1995) using important parts of the card text plus a private
key. Let us consider that after this hashing process we got a string of 39 bits, b =
100000010101000101101111110110100101000. Following the coding scheme presented in
Borges & Mayer (2006a) we first convert the bit string into his decimal representation, which
is Z = 277708533032. Now, suppose we are interesting in inserting two logos on that card. So,
we have K = 2. For our example, the mapping function will be Z = c1a1 + c2a2. As suggested
in Borges & Mayer (2006a) we define the coefficients ci = N
i−1, i = 1, . . . , N, where N is the
total amount of pixels of the document. So that, c1 = 1 and c2 = 1243 × 717 = 891231. The
positions a1 and a2 that represent the message b can be calculated by
Fig. 20. Example of a card to be authenticated by our method.
a2 =
⌊
Z
C2
⌋
= 311601 (28)
a1 =
⌊
Z − a2c2
c1
⌋
= 62201 (29)
It is important to notice that a1 and a2 are positions of the 1D vector representation of the
document image. In the 2D image, a conversion is needed and it gives us the pixels (51, 51)
for a1, and (251, 851) for a2. To assure good transparency of the logos, their energy will be
reduced to only 20%. In Fig. 21 we can see the ID card authenticated with two logos conveying
39 bits of information. This figure represents the ID card already processed by the PS channel.
For this case, the optimal threshold calculated is τ = 90.8. The detection values are depicted
in Fig. 22. In Fig. 23 we show with black points the estimated positions found by the detector.
More specifically, the insertion points estimated from the correlation peaks correspond to the
points (52, 52) and (253, 852). In accordance with the experiment in section 6.3, for the logo
used we need to consider an insertion region of 7× 7 pixels. In this experiment both points
were identified inside of the 7× 7 region. This guarantee we can correctly decode the message.
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Fig. 21. Example of a card authenticated with 39 bits using the method presented in this
paper.
Fig. 22. Detection plot of the Fig. 21.
Fig. 23. Estimation of the logos position. The black points indicate the estimated positions.
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7. Conclusion
We have presented a novel hardcopywatermarking technique to authenticate text documents.
The proposed method provides two forms of application: (i) authentication of documents
encoding relevant information of the document itself, or (ii) use of a document just to convey
a hidden message that do not have any relation to the document. We proposed a simple
and effective PS channel model for our problem. Experiments illustrated the robustness of
the method to the PS channel interferences. The proposed character segmentation allows
the detection of very low energy logos inserted into text documents and also allows it to
cooperatively work with other techniques, such as barcodes, without significantly interfering
on the performance of each other. Also we have investigated the applicability of the method
for documents printed on recycled paper. A new detector was derived for this application and
the better performance of this one was presented.
Future work will involve the improvement of the character segmentation, and the
development of a more realistic capacity equation for the method. Also, we believe the
detection process could be improved by the knowledge of the whole authentication process
and noise involved in the process.
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9. Appendix: Detector statistics
This appendix derives the results presented in equation (24).
The mean of Tpn(y) to the hypothesis H0 (µpn|H0) is given by the expectation E{Tpn(y);H0},
therefore
µpn|H0 = E{ηTR−1s}
= E{ηT}R−1s
= 0. (30)
The mean of Tpn(y) to the hypothesis H1 (µpn|H1) is given by the expectation E{Tpn(y);H1},
therefore
µpn|H1 = E{(s + η)TR−1s}
= E{sTR−1s + ηTR−1s}
= sTR−1s + E{ηTR−1s}
= sTR−1s + E{ηT}R−1s
= sTR−1s (31)
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The variance of Tpn(y) to the hypothesis H0 (σ2pn|H0) is given by the expectation
E{Tpn(y)2;H0} − E{Tpn(y);H0}2, therefore
σ
2
pn|H0 = E{Tpn(y)2;H0} − E{Tpn(y);H0}2
= E{Tpn(y)2;H0}
= E{(yTR−1s)2}
= E{(ηTR−1s)2}
= E{ηTR−1sηTR−1s}.
Now, letting a = R−1s we have
σ
2
pn|H0 = E{ηTaηTa}
= E{(ηTa)TηTa}
= E{aTηηTa}
= aTRa
=
(
R−1s
)T
R
(
R−1s
)
= sTR−1
T
s (32)
The variance of Tpn(y) to the hypothesis H1 (σ2pn|H1) is given by the expectation
E{Tpn(y)2;H1} − E{Tpn(y);H1}2, therefore
σ
2
pn|H1 = E{Tpn(y)2;H1} − E{Tpn(y);H1}2
= E{(yTR−1s)2} − (sTR−1s)2
= E{yTR−1syTR−1s} − (sTR−1s)2
= E{(sTR−1s + ηTR−1s)(sTR−1s + ηTR−1s)} − (sTR−1s)2
= E{(sTR−1s)2 + sTR−1sηTR−1s + ηTR−1ssTR−1s+
+ (ηTR−1s)2} − (sTR−1s)2
= E{sTR−1sηTR−1s + ηTR−1ssTR−1s + (ηTR−1s)2}
= E{sTR−1sηTR−1s}+ E{ηTR−1ssTR−1s}+
+ E{ηTR−1sηTR−1s}
= sTR−1sE{ηT}R−1s + E{ηT}R−1ssTR−1s+
+ E{ηTR−1sηTR−1s}
= E{ηTR−1sηTR−1s}
= aTRa
=
(
R−1s
)T
R
(
R−1s
)
= sTR−1
T
s (33)
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